ABSTRACT: I argue that Descartes is not a reductionist about life, but dissolves or eliminates the category entirely. This is surprising both because he repeatedly refers to the life of humans, animals, and plants and because he appears to rely on the category of life to construct his physiology and medicine. Various attempts have been made in the scholarship to attribute a principled concept of life to Descartes. Most recently, Detlefsen (forthcoming) has argued that Descartes "is a reductionist with respect to explanation of life phenomena but not an eliminativist with respect to life itself" (4-5). I show that all these attempts either result in arbitrariness or force Descartes's wider philosophical project into incoherence. I argue that Descartes's ontological commitments make a principled concept of life impossible, that he does not need such a concept, and that his project ends up more coherent without one.
material, Cartesian alternative to the Aristotelian vegetative and sensitive souls.
3 And in the letter to Regius quoted above, he goes on to say that, [s] ince 'self-moving' is a category with respect to all machines that move of their own accord, which excludes others that are not self-moving, so 'life' may be taken as a category which includes the forms of all living things (to Regius, June 1642; CSMK: 214; AT III: 566).
So, although life ought not to be a category for Descartes, he appears to make it one. The problem is that, as both MacKenzie (1975: 2-3) and Detlefsen (forthcoming: 9) point out,
Descartes never provides a general concept of life. Given that his metaphysics does not allow him an ontological differentiation, it is not at all clear how the category of life can possibly be defined within his philosophical system. Just as it struggles with teleology, a purely material, mechanical ontology seems to lack the resources to separate out living creatures from the rest of the material world.
In what follows, I first assess the various suggestions for a Cartesian concept of life as found in the literature ( §2). There has been a series of systematic attempts to unearth a principled concept of life for Descartes, starting with MacKenzie (1975) , who builds on some ideas from Hall (1970) . The task is taken up again by Ablondi (1998) and then by Detlefsen (forthcoming). All take Descartes to have a general, principled concept of life, and each sees him as a reductionist, in one way or another, about that concept. They take him to reduce life to some thing, or to some set of things, in the material world (for Ablondi and Detlefsen, God also has a role to play in the reduction). Each of these articles shows how the concept put forward by its immediate predecessor is inadequate, arbitrary, or just plain wrong, before offering an alternative concept of its own.
My claim here is that the reason all these purported concepts of life turn out to be so unsatisfying is that looking for a general, principled concept of life in Descartes is the wrong approach to start with ( §3). Since he is entirely clear that life (whatever it might be) does not pertain to thinking substance (Passions 1/5; AT XI: 329), it cannot be reducible to pure thought. But because his material ontology lacks the resources to discriminate the living from the non-living, there is nothing in extended substance for life to be reduced to either.
And, as Detlefsen points out (25; 40-1), Descartes commits himself to the inscrutability of God, for good reasons (AT VII: 55, , thus making God unavailable to support a concept of life. There is nowhere in Descartes's ontology for a concept of life to reside. The more suitable approach, then, is to think that Descartes does away with a concept of life ( §3.1). He does not reduce it to something material. He does not look to God's intentions. What he does is dissolve or eliminate the category. Rather than addressing his account of physiology to the nature of life itself, and to finding a material source for it, Descartes takes on the traditional phenomena of physiology (cardiac heat, respiration, nutrition, generation, etc.) one by one and provides a material explanation for each. These explanations do not afford the reconstitution of any general, univocal concept of life.
Consequently, in the process, the concept is dissolved away. 4 If I am right about this, it means that Descartes recognised something that Machery has far more recently proposed for modern biology: that "the project of defining life is either impossible or pointless" (2011:
There are parallels between this reading of Descartes and eliminativist materialist positions with respect to the mind. In eliminative materialism, "thoughts," "beliefs," "mind states,"
etc. are merely the terms of folk psychology, and they fail to refer to anything real. That is, there is nothing to which they can be reduced. As such, neuroscience has no need to attempt to explain them (nor could it): mind states should be eliminated from the science, which should focus instead on physical brain states. In his landmark paper on the elimination of propositional attitudes, Paul Churchland concludes Similarly, doing away with the notion of life itself is, presumably, a productive displacement that gives Descartes new possibilities (such as pervasive iatromechanism) for his work on physiology and medicine.
There are several advantages to the "dissolutionist" reading. Most importantly, it makes sense of the complete absence of an attempt to work out a general concept of life anywhere in Descartes's work and correspondence (if the lack of a concept of life "would render incoherent" Descartes's work on physiology and medicine, as Detlefsen claims (forthcoming: 2), for him to ignore it as he does would be a significant oversight). It is also Life H := "an ensemble of functions that have their kinetic origin in heat-specifically a certain 'fire without light' that burns, in men and animals, in the heart" (Hall 1970: 61) .
Life H deals nicely with the case of the dead-but-warm eel heart: the eel heart is dead because it is not acting as the source of movement for some ensemble of functions. If the eel's warm heart were instead driving its life functions, it (or, rather, the eel) would be alive. Hall does not identify these functions, leaving Life H , as it stands, somewhat vague. But the principle behind it is straightforward: life is not simply the heat of the heart, but a group of lifefunctions that are driven by the heat of the heart. It is the combination of cardiac heat with the ensemble of functions that is meant to provide sufficiency to the concept. In this case, it does not matter too much exactly what the functions are: they are life functions precisely because they are driven by the heat of the heart that is unique to living bodies. The lifefunctions are necessary here just because cardiac heat alone is insufficient for life, but it is still cardiac heat that does the bulk of the work in Life H . There might be some traction in generalising the definition by omitting the specification after the dash in Hall's formulation:
Life H2 := an ensemble of functions that have their kinetic origin in heat.
This obviates the need to refer to the heart itself. And since there is at least one instance in which Descartes claims that plants too are driven by heat (AT III: 122), Life H2 is inclusive enough to account for plant life. However, without the restriction of specifically cardiac heat and its fire without light, the concept becomes too inclusive. Take, for example, the heating and water-boiling functions of a stove. They have their kinetic origin in heat. 11 If we want an overarching concept of life, presumably we want it to exclude stoves while including plants.
Since heat as kinetic origin is not specific enough to provide that restriction, it makes sense to look to the functions themselves: if it is only certain functions that are life-functions, and if water-boiling and heating are not on the list, the concept can effectively exclude stoves while including humans, animals, and plants. In the next section, I look at how MacKenzie builds on exactly this basis in attempting to specify a Cartesian concept of life (1975: 4).
A list of life-functions
Where Life H relied on the specificity of cardiac heat as source of motion to identify a given function as a life-function, MacKenzie explicitly moves the burden of specification to the functions themselves:
[t]he principle of motion in plants and animals without hearts will be that which (together with proper structure) enables them to engage in those determinate activities which in turn enable them to perform their life This is a straightforward reversal of the hierarchy in Life H . The life-functions are constant, but the activities that produce them can differ-in some cases, it will be cardiac heat that drives the life-functions, and in others it will be something else. On MacKenzie's reading, rather than doing the bulk of the work in defining life, cardiac heat gets to be involved in life only if it produces life-functions. It is the functions themselves that do the work.
Indeed, activities such as cardiac heat will figure in MacKenzie's definition only in the general stipulation that they be mechanical and material, so as to rule out psychistic principles of life (1975: 6).
The functions MacKenzie identifies as life-functions are simply nutrition, growth and generation (1975: 8). Accordingly, her (explicitly stated) definition is
Life MK := "x is alive if and only if x has an arrangement of parts which (together with motion) enables x to gain nourishment from its environment, to grow, and to reproduce " (1975: 8) .
In this definition, cardiac heat has been generalised to an arrangement of parts plus motion, which is inclusive enough to allow life to humans, animals, and plants, as well as to any other living thing that might happen to operate in a different manner. It rules out psychistic explanations via the suppressed assumption that parts are necessarily material. According to Life MK , anything, heartless or not, will count as alive as long as it gains nourishment from its environment, grows, and reproduces. In this case, Life MK is meant to reduce life to a set of processes (life-functions) that are material by virtue of the arrangement-of-parts prescription.
Since the three life-functions are doing the work in Life MK , we would expect them to be robustly specified and well grounded. (1975: 8, n. 16 ).
The first problem with Life MK is that, with the life-functions doing the work, a decision on precisely which functions they are is entirely necessary for the concept to be meaningful.
Without that decision, Life MK becomes empty and arbitrary. With the list removed, Life MK would read, "x is alive if and only if x has an arrangement of parts which (together with motion) enables x to perform some set of functions." This formulation would apply to any functioning machine; it only becomes specific to life when that set of functions is specified.
Without the life-functions, Life MK tells us nothing about life. In the absence of those functions, there is nothing for life to be reduced to. The second problem is that, as Life A := "(1) possession of an internal source of heat which serves as a principle of motion, and (2) having the complexity which only God can give a thing" (Ablondi 1998: 185 human bodies undoubtedly do have a higher degree of complexity than clocks, they must also have a different kind of complexity-a theogenic kind of complexity (1998: 184-5).
Ablondi himself recognises the problem with theogenic complexity:
there must be some recognizable feature flowing from this complexity which enables us to conclude that we can't produce things that complex. To say this feature is 'life' is to beg the question; the complexity of the thing has to be identifiable apart from its divine origin if the claim is to function as a genuine criterion (1998: 184).
The trouble is that the mechanical complexity of the human body-machine exists entirely within the material world. automatons which move without thought, it seems reasonable that nature should even produce its own automatons, which are much more splendid than artificial ones -namely the animals" (5 February 1649; CSMK: 366; AT V: 277). This is not especially conclusive. In none of these passages does Descartes indicate that greater complexity is constitutive of life, rather than being merely a contingent feature of animal and human bodies.
In the letter to More, Descartes is arguing against animal intelligence and is attempting to deflect the objection that animal behaviour is too close to intelligent human behaviour to be thoughtless. His strategy is to show that animal behaviour is on a continuum with that of manmade automata, rather than with human thought. It should not be too surprising, he reminds More, if natural automata happen to be noticeably more "splendid" (praestantiora)
than their manmade equivalents. In summing up his argument, he explicitly tells More, Life A attempts to conceptualise life by reducing it to two things in the material world: (1) heat as an underlying source of motion plus (2) theogenic complexity. Theogenic complexity, however, is not definable in terms of matter. Ablondi is aware of this but thinks the textual evidence warrants attributing a concept of life to Descartes that is incoherent with his system. The incoherence alone would be enough to call for suspicion, but, as we have seen, the textual evidence itself also turns out to provide little support for Life A .
God's intentions
The treatments of life we have looked at so far have all tried to find a concept of life through reduction to something in the material world. There are good reasons for this approach, given Descartes's repeated insistence that life pertains to extended substance, and not to thinking substance. Detlefsen, however, recognises that extended substance does not have the resources to sustain a concept of life; the purely material conditions will have to be shored up by something extramaterial. For Detlefsen, the extramaterial ingredient lies in Life D 's reliance on teleology is a problem. As Descartes keeps reminding us, whatever life is, it is entirely material (e.g. AT XI: 329-31; AT III: 566), and activity occurs in matter (extended substance) exclusively through mechanical means (AT VIIIA: 54, 314). As such, matter can have no intrinsic ends, and the only recourse for teleology is through extrinsic ends. For manmade artefacts, extrinsic ends are easy to come by: a hammer is for hammering because someone designed it with that purpose. Similarly, for natural bodies, extrinsic ends would have to come from God: a heart is for pumping blood because God designed it with that purpose.
But Descartes rules out access to God's intentions and excludes them from any role in natural philosophy 14 : we are limited, while "the nature of God is immense, incomprehensible and infinite" and thus "capable of countless things whose causes are beyond my knowledge. God's purposes even as merely likely true beliefs in our explanations about the natural world, and so we cannot explain the teleological nature of (at least some) life activities by relying upon hypothetical claims to God's purposes as embodied in (at least some) living bodies
Detlefsen argues that, without a concept of life, Descartes would have no way to identify living bodies as the subject of the life sciences, which "would render incoherent" his work on biology (2 the ways outlined in §1? He is certainly not averse to using the term, and his use of it does seem to be meaningful. There are several possible replies to this objection. One is simply to suggest that, compared to the loss of the coherence of either metaphysics or biology that strong reductionist positions about Descartes's conception of life seem to result in, the occasional use of a term with no strict, principled definition seems like a minor infraction, especially if nothing of much significance rests on it (see §3.3 below). This is a fairly reasonable response, but it is not particularly satisfying. A better variation would be to claim that "life," in this context, is something like a folk term. Just as a strict physicalist might sometimes find it more convenient to talk about desires rather than the specific brain-states desires reduce down to, so Descartes finds it more convenient to talk about a living animal rather than a non-manmade automaton with whatever attributes and behaviours happen to be relevant to the particular automaton in question.
19
A stronger variation on this latter response would point out that "life" is not just a folk term Descartes does not, then, use the term "life" because it is well-defined in the Cartesian system but because it is well-defined in the Aristotelian system-and his aim when using the term is to show that all the phenomena an Aristotelian will associate with life are mechanistically explicable.
20
19 Wolfe (2010: 204) discusses instrumental uses of the term "organism" in modern biology in much the same way.
20 Somewhat similar aims crop up throughout Descartes's natural philosophy, of course. In the explanation of fire in the
World, e.g., Descartes makes a point of how his mechanics can account for just as much as an Aristotelian "form of fire"
and "quality of heat," while being both more explanatory and less ontologically extravagant (CSM I: 83; AT XI: 7-9).
3. 22 Consequently, it is not life itself that gives unity to this "aspect of his life as a working natural philosopher" (Detlefsen: 2); it is the potential of physiology and anatomy for the medical treatment of humans. And since humans are not just bodies but unions of soul and body, teleology is not a problem for (human) medicine: medicine can legitimately be an end for the Cartesian natural philosopher's pursuit of biology. Life itself, then, is not necessary for constituting the discipline of biology for
Descartes. Consequently, dissolutionism about life is not a problem for Cartesian biology.
